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Abstract – The object of this paper is to review various 
methods of determining the extent of hazardous areas in 
industrial facilities where explosive gas or vapor atmospheres 
may be present. Three different approaches are analyzed and 
compared. The first one is recommended in North American 
Standards, such as API500 [1], API505 [2] and NFPA 497 [3]. 
The second is one of the proposals for the second edition of the 
International Standard IEC 60079-10-1 [4] (adopted as 
European standard EN 60079-10-1). The third approach had 
been previously worked out with the authors‘ contribution and 
had been adopted by the Italian Guide CEI 31-35 since 2001 
[5]. The last two approaches are analytical, meanwhile the first 
one is prescriptive. In the second part of the paper both 
analytical approaches are applied to the releases which are 
analyzed in NFPA 497 [3] as practical examples. Resulting 
hazardous area extents are compared and the differences 
among the three methods are discussed. 
 
Index Terms — Hazardous area classification, Gas 
atmospheres, International standards, Risk analysis, 
Explosions. 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
For many years the risk of explosion and the consequent 
requirement for the classification of areas has been a concern 
worldwide [6] and in the beginning industry codes were mainly 
used [7]. In 1994 and 1999 two ATEX directives were published 
by the European Parliament, respectively Directive 94/9/EC [8] 
and Directive 99/92/EC [9]. The first deals with equipment and 
protective systems intended for use in potentially explosive 
atmospheres; the latter with the safety and health protection of 
workers potentially at risk from explosive atmospheres. In 
particular, Directive 99/92/EC [9] requires that the employer 
adopts adequate measures in order to prevent the formation of 
explosive atmospheres, avoid their ignition and mitigate the 
detrimental effects of an explosion. Among these measures is 
the classification of the places where explosive atmospheres 
may occur. 
The regulations provided by the second ATEX Directive have 
been adopted in the International Standard IEC 60079-10-1 [4]; 
in Italy, moreover, since 2001 the Guide CEI 31-35  has been 
published. Recently a new version of CEI 31-35 [5] has been 
issued, incorporating some novelties in the hazardous areas 
evaluation. Also, a new version has been proposed and is in 
draft (its publication is forecasted for December 2013) for the 
International Standard IEC 60079-10-1[10]. One of the 
proposals for the new IEC Standard incorporates a new 
approach for the evaluation of the extent of hazardous areas, 
which was initially presented by researchers of the Health and 
Safety Laboratory (UK) [11]. 
In the United States other Standards, with similar methods, 
are used for the classification of hazardous locations [12], while 
in South American Countries sometimes IEC Standards are 
applied [13]. In the United States API [1],[2], and NFPA [3] 
Recommended Practices are used. Particularly, API standards 
[1],[2] are the most commonly used ones in North America for 
the Oil and Gas industry. 
The two main sets of Standards, North American and 
European, have been compared for what concerns the 
protection methodologies [14] but the Standard variety is vast 
and for this reason we think there is the need for some 
exchange of knowledge between the experiences of different 
Countries in this field. 
This paper compares the area classification approaches 
adopted by the API [1],[2], and the NFPA Recommended 
Practice [3], to the future Standard IEC 60079-10-1 [10] and to 
the Italian Guide CEI 31-35 [5]. It analyzes the procedure for 
the area extent assessment and then it illustrates some 
examples of classification carried out following the prescriptions 
of the three different methodologies. 
 
 
II.  DIFFERENT APPROACHES IN AREA 
CLASSIFICATION 
 
Nowadays two different approaches deal with the classification 
of hazardous areas, whenever flammable concentrations of gas 
may arise. 
The first approach, used to classify hazardous locations, is 
the one proposed by both NFPA 497 [3] and by API 500 [1], 
which are published in the United States respectively by the 
National Fire Protection Association and by the American 
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Petroleum Institute (API). According to these Standards, the 
hazardous locations are to be classified Class I  Division 1 or 
Division 2. In Division 1 ignitable concentrations of flammable 
gases or vapors can exist under normal conditions. In Class I 
Division 2 ignitable concentrations of flammable substances 
escape and are present only under abnormal conditions, when 
accidental rupture or unusual faulty operation occurs and the 
flammable material is no longer confined within a closed 
system. Class I Division 2 is also applied to a location adjacent 
to a Division 1 location, to which ignitable concentrations of 
gases might occasionally be communicated. 
The second approach is proposed by the Standard IEC 
60079-10-1[4]. According to this approach, hazardous locations 
(in which an explosive gas atmosphere is present, or may be 
expected to be present) shall be classified in Zones on the 
basis of the frequency of occurrence and persistence of the 
dangerous atmosphere, as reported in Table I. 
 
TABLE I 
ZONE TYPES (IEC 60079-10-1) 
ZONE 0 An explosive atmosphere is present continuously or for long periods or frequently 
ZONE 1 An explosive atmosphere is likely to occur in normal operation occasionally 
ZONE 2 
An explosive atmosphere is not likely to occur in 
normal operation but, if it does occur, will persist for a 
short period only 
 
In accordance with Table B.1 of Standard IEC EN 60079-10-
1 [5] (Table II below) the type of zone can be evaluated, 
knowing three parameters: the grade of release, the degree 
and availability of the ventilation. 
 
TABLE II  
INFLUENCE OF VENTILATION AND GRADE OF RELEASE ON TYPE OF ZONE 
(IEC 60079-10-1) 
 
 
Sources of release are classified in the following three grades 
of release: 
 continuous grade of release when the release is 
continuous  or is expected to occur frequently or for long 
periods; 
 primary grade of release when the release can be 
expected to occur periodically or occasionally during 
normal operation; 
 secondary grade of release when the release is not 
expected to occur in normal operation and, if it does 
occur, is likely to do so infrequently and for short 
periods. 
 
Two aspects of ventilation are considered in controlling 
dispersion and persistence of the explosive atmosphere: the 
degree of ventilation and its availability. 
 
Three degrees of ventilation are identified: 
 high ventilation (HV) can reduce the concentration at 
the source of release virtually instantaneously, resulting 
in a concentration below the lower explosive limit. A 
zone of negligible extent may result (depending on the 
availability of the ventilation); 
 medium ventilation (MV) can control the concentration, 
resulting in a stable zone boundary while the release is 
in progress and in the elimination of the explosive 
atmosphere after the release has stopped; 
 low ventilation (LV) cannot control the concentration 
while release is in progress and/or cannot prevent the 
persistence of an explosive atmosphere after release 
has stopped. 
The concept of degree of ventilation is related to the flow 
rate of the ventilation itself and obviously it is not an 
absolute concept, but it is related with the flow rate of the 
source of release. 
 
Three levels of ventilation availability are considered: 
 good if ventilation is present virtually continuously; 
 fair if ventilation is expected to be present during normal 
operation. Discontinuities are permitted provided they 
occur infrequently and for short periods; 
 poor if ventilation does not meet the standards of fair or 
good, but discontinuities are not expected to occur for 
long periods. 
 
The philosophy behind the IEC standard is that an 
installation in a hazardous area is safe if there are, at least, 
three safety barriers against explosion. These three safety 
barriers can be provided partly by the type of Zone itself 
(likelihood of presence of an explosive atmosphere), partly by 
the installed equipment (likelihood of ignition). The safety 
barriers provided by the type of Zone are related to the 
likelihood of presence of an explosive atmosphere in this way: 
Zone 0 has zero safety barriers, Zone 1 has itself one safety 
barrier, Zone 2 has itself two safety barriers. Table III shows 
the levels of protection for the equipment (EPLs) [8][9], in 
order to achieve the three safety barriers required for each 
kind of Zone. In particular: 
 Zone 0 (0 intrinsic safety barriers) requires equipment 
with 3 safety barriers; 
 Zone 1 (1 intrinsic safety barrier) requires equipment 
with 2 safety barriers 
 Zone 2 (2 intrinsic safety barriers) requires equipment 
with 1 safety barrier. 
The IEC Standard [4] seems to be more refined in 
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comparison to the North American Standards [1][2][3]. The 
three Zones established by IEC are in fact based on how often 
the hazard is present and the difference between continuous 
and primary grade of release is taken into account; in the 
Division approach instead, Division 1 covers both Continuous 
(IEC Zone 0) and Primary (IEC Zone 1). Thus, by splitting 
Division 1 into Zone 0 and Zone 1, it is possible to limit the most 
stringent methods of protection to Zone 0 areas and to have 
more methods of protection in Zone 1 areas. Zone 2 and 
Division 2 areas are similar in description and methods of 
protection allowed.  
Nowadays however, North American Standards also describe 
the Zones approach, and this approach is often used for new 
facilities classification, applying in particular API 505 [2].  
 
TABLE III   
EPLS AND ZONES  
likelihood of 
presence of 
explosive 
atmosphere 
 
likelihood 
of ignition 
Zone Equipment Protection Group/Category/
EPL  
Zone 0 
An explosive 
atmosphere is 
present 
continuously 
or for long 
periods or 
frequently  
 
(zero safety 
barrier) 
 
Equipment for 
explosive gas 
atmospheres, 
having a 'very 
high' level of 
protection, which 
is not a source of 
ignition in normal 
operation or when 
subject to faults 
that may be 
expected or when 
subject to rare 
faults. 
Two independent 
means of 
protection or safe 
even when two 
faults occur 
independently of 
each other. 
 
 
(three safety 
barriers) 
Group II  
Category 1G 
EPL Ga 
 
Zone 1 
An explosive 
atmosphere is 
likely to occur 
in normal 
operation 
occasionally 
 
 
 
 
 
(one safety 
barrier) 
Equipment for 
explosive gas 
atmospheres, 
having a ‘high’ 
level of  
protection, which 
is not a source of 
ignition in normal 
operation or when 
subject to faults 
that may be 
expected, though 
not necessarily 
on a regular 
basis. 
II /2 G 
Suitable for 
normal operation 
and frequently 
occurring 
disturbances or 
equipment where 
faults are 
normally taken 
into account  
 
 
(two safety 
barriers) 
Group II  
Category 2G 
EPL Gb 
 
Zone 2 
An explosive 
atmosphere is 
not likely to 
occur in 
normal 
operation but, 
if it does 
occur, will 
persist for a 
short period 
only  
 
 
 
 
 
(two safety 
barriers) 
Equipment for 
explosive gas 
atmospheres, 
having a 
‘enhanced’ level 
of protection, 
which is not a 
source of ignition 
in normal 
operation and 
which may have 
some additional 
protection to 
ensure that it 
remains inactive 
as an ignition 
source in the 
case of regular 
expected 
occurrences. 
Suitable for 
normal 
operation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(one safety 
barrier) 
Group II  
Category 3G 
EPL Gc 
 
 
For what concerns the influence of ventilation in the 
classification, API 505 [2] and NFPA 497 [3] distinguish 
between ‘adequate’ and ‘not adequate’ ventilation: an 
‘adequate ventilation’ is sufficient to prevent the accumulation of 
significant quantities of vapor-air or gas-air mixtures in 
concentration above 25 percent of their lower flammable limit 
(LEL). Moreover API 505 [2] indicates how to estimate if 
ventilation is adequate or not and explains that if adequate 
ventilation is provided, many enclosed locations may be 
classified Zone 2 instead of Zone 1 and some locations may be 
classified Zone 1 instead of Zone 0. 
On the other hand, IEC Standard [4] takes ventilation into 
account in a more sophisticated way, considering both the 
degree and the availability of the ventilation, and analyzing its 
impact on the hazardous location. This implies that, for 
example, a theoretical Zone 1 produced by a primary grade of 
release and classified by North American Standards as Zone 1, 
according to the IEC Standard [4], in the presence of a good 
availability of high ventilation, becomes a non hazardous 
location. On the contrary, for example, areas characterized by a 
secondary grade of release and classified by North American 
Standards as Zone 2, in the presence of a low degree of 
ventilation can be classified by IEC as Zone 1 or even as Zone 
0. 
  
 
III.  THE EVALUATION OF THE EXTENT OF 
HAZARDOUS AREAS 
IEC 60079-10-1 [3] introduces the ‘Hypothetical volume’ (‘Vz’) 
concept. Vz is defined as the volume in which the average 
concentration of the gas in air is equal to a critical threshold 
which is fixed by the LEL of the gas. IEC introduces equation 
(1) to calculate Vz. 
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LELkC m
 maxgz )f(QV                          (1) 
 where 
 f is the efficiency of the ventilation in terms of its 
effectiveness in diluting the explosive gas atmosphere 
 C is the number of fresh air changes per unit time [s-1] 
 k is a safety factor  
 LELm is the lower explosive limit [kg/m3] 
 T is the ambient temperature [K] 
 (Qg)max is the maximum release rate of gas from a container 
[kg/s]; if the gas velocity is choked, Qg may be estimated by 
means of equation (2) [15] 
 
1)1)/2((
dg 1
2
TR
MCpSQ







            (2) 
where: 
 S is the cross section of the opening, through which gas is 
released [m2] 
 p is the pressure inside the container [Pa] 
 Cd is the coefficient of discharge [15] 
  is the polytropic index of adiabatic expansion 
 M is the molecular mass of gas [kg/kmol] 
 R is the universal gas constant [J kmol–1 K–1] 
 T is the absolute temperature inside the container [K]. 
The volume Vz can be used to assess the degree of 
ventilation [16]. In fact IEC suggests evaluating a high degree of 
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ventilation when the calculated value of Vz is less than 1% of 
the room volume. On the other hand, according to IEC, 
ventilation should be regarded as low if Vz exceeds the room 
volume.  
At the moment in IEC 60079-10-1[3] there are no formulas to 
estimate the extent of the hazardous zones. The given formulas 
are used only to perform the ventilation study of the location. 
Another approach, summarized in [11], has been proposed to 
be considered in the new version of IEC 60079-10 [10].This 
approach had been studied by the HSL (‘Health and Safety 
Laboratory’ ) which is an in-house agency of the UK ‘Health and 
Safety Executive. HSL developed an integral model of gas 
dispersion and from this model an analytic formula for the 
hypothetical volume Vz, had been derived and validated against 
CFD (‘Computational Fluid Dynamics’) simulations.  
As it is shown in [11], in the case of outdoor releases, Vz is 
calculated by means of equation (3) . 
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where 
Xcrit is the critical concentration of interest [vol/vol] 
ρa is the density of ambient air [kg/m3] 
ρs is the gas density [kg/m3] 
is the entrainment coefficient 
rs [m] is the actual hole radius in the case of subsonic jets. 
Gas jets are expected to be sonic in releases from pressures of 
0.89 bar above atmospheric or higher. In these cases, outside 
the release source, as the gas pressure drops to ambient 
pressure, then the gas density drops also and the jet cross-
sectional area must grow to balance the density drop. Thus, in 
the case of sonic jets, rs is the radius of a pseudo-source and it 
is estimated by equation (4). 
 



  89,15,010
ap
prsr                             (4) 
where 
r0 is the actual hole radius 
p/pa is the ratio of storage pressure to ambient pressure.  
It is important to note that, according to this approach, the 
hypothetical volume is strongly dependent to the jet source 
size, because Vz is proportional to the cube of the source 
radius. 
On the other hand, the Italian Guide CEI 31-35 [5] introduces 
an equation for the evaluation of the hazardous distance (dz), 
which is the distance from the source, along the central axis of 
the jet, at which the flammable gas concentration is reduced to 
the LEL of the gas. This formula, shown in equation (5), was 
worked out by the authors in previous works [17],[18],[19] and it 
is used to calculate the hazardous distance dz for jet gas 
releases, when release velocity u0 ≥ 10 m/s. 
 
0,4
vdz
z0,5
z MLELk
k)S P(5,2d 
              (5) 
 
where: 
 S is the cross section of the source of release [m2]; 
 P is the absolute pressure inside the containment system 
[Pa]; 
 M is the flammable substance molar mass [Kg/Kmol]; 
 LELv is the substance lower explosive limit, expressed in 
volume per cent; 
 kz is a correction coefficient to account for the gas or vapour 
concentration in the far field (far away from the source of 
release, where the gas or vapour is completely mixed with 
air); in the case of open space release kz = 1; 
 kdz is the safety coefficient applied to the LEL for the 
calculation of dz; it assumes values between 0.25 and 0.5 
for releases of continuous and primary grade and values 
between 0.5 and 0.75 for secondary grade releases. 
Experimental measures have been carried out in the case of a 
natural gas release [20] and have been compared with the 
calculations suggested by the Italian Guide CEI 31-35 [5].The 
experimental data of the gas release fit quite well the theoretical 
model suggested by the Italian Guide for the calculation of the 
hazardous distance. 
 
 
IV.  CASE STUDY I 
 
The first example considered is a leakage located outdoor, at 
grade. The material is a compressed flammable gas. 
NFPA 497 [3], in figure 5.9.2 (a), indicates the classification, 
using Divisions, showed in Fig. 1. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Leakage  of compressed flammable gas located 
outdoor  
 
The same classification, using zones, is reported in fig. 
5.10.2 (a) of NFPA 497 [3], where the figure is identical but 
Division 1 and 2 are replaced respectively by Zone 1 and 2. 
This evaluation considers a process equipment size and a flow 
rate from “Small” to “Moderate” and a pressure from “Moderate” 
to  “High”. It means a pressure range from 100 psi to more than 
500 psi (in this example we assume 1000 psi) and a flow rate 
from less than 100 gpm (in this example we assume 50 gpm) to 
500 gpm. The extent of Zone 2 (or Division 2) is, in all cases, 
4.57 m. 
Converting inches and gallons to international units and 
considering methane as flammable gas (density 0.65 kg·m−3) it 
means a pressure in the range of 6.9 to 69 bar and a flow rate 
from 2.07 to 20.7 g/s. 
Basing on equation (2) it is possible to analytically find out  
the dimension of the leakage corresponding to a flow rate of 
2.07 g/s at 6.9 bar (or a 20.7 g/s at 69 bar): the cross section of 
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the opening, through which gas is released is approximately 2 
mm2.  
The calculation made with relation (5), assuming the chemical 
parameters of methane and a safety coefficient kdz=0.5 (i.e. 
considering a zone boundary with concentration 0.5 LEL), gives 
an extension of the hazardous zone (dz)  from  approximately 1 
m to 3 m as showed in fig. 2. 
 
Fig. 2. Extent of the zone with formula (5)   
 
It is clear from this example that the classification provided by 
the NFPA Standard is much more conservative, especially for 
low pressures of the gas in the containment system. The Italian 
guide instead requires a more complicated study, involving 
some calculations, but gives a smaller hazardous area (with a 
size depending on the characteristics of the source of 
emission). 
A smaller hazardous area may mean smaller expenses for 
electrical components, as more components can be installed 
outside of the hazardous area.  
 
 
 
V.  CASE STUDY II 
 
The second example is a leakage of flammable liquid located 
indoor, at floor level. 
NFPA 497 [3], in figures 5.9.1 (e) and 5.10.1 (e), indicates 
the classification, using respectively Divisions and Zones, 
where is assumed that an adequate ventilation is provided. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Leakage  of flammable liquid located indoor, 
ventilation adequate  
 
Figure 5.9.1 (e) is reported in Fig. 3. Figure 5.10.1 (e) is 
identical to Fig. 3, but Division 1 and 2 are replaced respectively 
by Zone 1 and 2. 
The same leakage is analyzed in NFPA 497 [3], figures 5.9.1 
(f) – divisions - and 5.10.1 (f) - zones - when adequate 
ventilation is not provided, Fig. 4. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Leakage  of flammable liquid located indoor, 
ventilation not adequate  
 
As shown in Fig. 3, when an adequate ventilation is provided 
and prevents communication of ignitable concentrations of 
gases, Zone 2 is confined to a limited part of the building, 
around the source of emission. If not, as shown in Fig. 4, Zone 
2 fills the entire building and a Zone 1 appears close to the 
source of release. The calculation in the far field is determined 
assuming the concentration to be homogenous, regardless the 
small “pockets” of higher concentration near source of release 
[2]. 
This approach is very similar to the concept of degree of 
ventilation  of IEC 6007910-1 [4] where medium ventilation 
(MV) “can control the concentration, resulting in a stable zone 
boundary, while the release is in progress”. In other words, with 
MV, the hazardous location is present only near the source of 
release and the concentration of explosive atmosphere outside 
this boundary is far less than the LEL.  
Guide CEI 31-35 [5] fixes the concentration in the field which 
is far away from the source of release, where the vapor is 
completely mixed with air: Xm%, above which the MV is 
achieved, as follows: 
a
 v
m f
LELk%X                                  (6) 
where k is a safety factor (k=0.25 to 0.5) and fa is a coefficient 
depending on the effectiveness of the ventilation (i.e. the 
interaction between source of release and ventilation). The 
coefficient fa is to be chosen in the range 1 to 5. 
If the condition on Xm% not fulfilled, the degree of ventilation is 
low (LV) and the hazardous location fills the entire building. 
Note that LV is very similar to the assumption of “ventilation 
not adequate” of NFPA. 
In the case of medium ventilation the extent of hazardous 
zone (Zone 2 in this case) depends on the flow rate of  the 
leakage (i.e. the area of the pool formed at the ground). 
The calculation of dz (assuming a pool of gasoline and 0.5 m/s 
as the air speed near the pool) can be carried out with the 
equation (7) [15]. Equation (7) is introduced (as equation (5), 
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mentioned above) in the Italian Guide CEI 31-35 [5]; 
particularly, equation (5) regards gas jet release, meanwhile 
equation (7) regards  a vapor release from a pool of flammable 
liquid. 
0.70-
vdz
05
v
z A)LELk(
10Pd 


 

26.
1.
M
5.3                 (7) 
 
where: 
 A is the size of the pool [m2]; 
 Pv is the vapor pressure [Pa]; 
 M is the flammable substance molar mass [Kg/Kmol]; 
 LELv is the substance lower explosive limit, expressed in 
volume per cent; 
 kdz is the safety coefficient applied to the LEL for the 
calculation of dz; it assumes values between 0.25 and 0.5 
for releases of continuous and primary grade and values 
between 0.5 and 0.75 for secondary grade releases. 
Fig. 5 shows the extent of the hazardous zone for different 
sizes of the pool. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Extent of the zone calculated with equation (7)   
 
The NFPA Standard[3] leads to more conservative results in 
the size of the hazardous location as it only considers the 
influence of ventilation, whereas Guide CEI 31-35 [5] considers 
both the influence of ventilation and the leak flow rate. 
 
 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper the approaches to the classification of 
hazardous areas proposed by the North American Standards  
API 500 [1], API 505 [2] and NFPA 497 [3], by the European 
Standard IEC 60079-10-1 and by the Italian guide CEI 31-35 [5] 
are compared. The different types of Zones-Divisions, the 
ventilation influence and the evaluation of the hazardous zone 
size are analyzed and compared. 
In the case study examples it is showed that the North 
American approach involves less calculations and is easier to 
be used; however, if compared with the IEC and Italian CEI 
guide approach, it leads to a bigger estimation of the 
Zone/Division extent, especially for low pressures in the 
containment system (gas releases) and for low flow rates of the 
source of release (liquid releases). 
A bigger estimation of the Zone/Division extent often means 
higher expenses in the installation of the electrical equipment: 
in fact special equipment may need to be be used instead of 
normal one. Also permits-to-work and work procedures are 
affected. For sure, instead, a bigger estimation leads to a safer 
classification. However it is showed in literature [16],[20] that 
the results obtained through calculation using the Italian method 
lead to conservative results with respect to Computational Fluid 
Dynamics (CFD) simulations and experimental measures. 
The differentiation between Zone 0 and Zone 1 in the 
European approach (both included in Division 1 in the NFPA 
approach) allows for a higher safety of installation as it is 
possible to restrict methods of protection in Zone 0 and to have 
more methods of protection in Zone 1. 
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